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[F]alsifiability and replication are of secondary importance to advancement of scientific fields.
—Iso-Ahola, 2017
A cultural divide is forming in psychology: while some researchers are skeptical of research practices
and standards prior to the current replicability crisis (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017), others have strong
faith in the published literature (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2016). This difference of perspectives drives
many current debates, and is also visible in a new paper in Frontiers in Psychology by Iso-Ahola,
titled “Reproducibility in psychological science: When do psychological phenomena exist”, in
which the author states that prior findings cannot be all dismissed as flukes “because they were
published in the best journals of social psychology” (Iso-Ahola, 2017).
In the piece, Iso-Ahola sets out the idea that experiments are only able to show evidence for
phenomena, but can never “prove a negative.” This makes it impossible to falsify psychological
ideas like the ego depletion effect (Baumeister et al., 1998). He argues that “reproducibility in
psychology is unattainable,” and “that psychological phenomena, by their nature, are not fully
reproducible” because humans “can be astonishingly simple or irreducibly complex at various
times.” Iso-Ahola further claims that researchers have largely focused on isolated indicators—such
as effect size and replicability—to determine whether psychological phenomena exist. Contrasting
these practices, he proposes 10 criteria to vet psychological phenomena. Instead of attempting to
perform exact replications that make little sense since they cannot disprove theories, the author
argues that researchers should use conceptual replications to “attempt to establish a phenomenon’s
boundary conditions”. Iso-Ahola’s default position seems to be that all phenomena exist. He puts
the burden of proof on the skeptics, and not on those who claim they have identified psychological
phenomena, arguing that “nobody has provided a theoretically and logically rigorous rationale and
justification why ego depletion as a phenomenon should and would not exist.”
We agree that some of the language around replication could be more precise and that direct
replications could be improved in several respects (Klein et al., 2014; LeBel et al., 2017). We
disagree, however, with Iso-Ahola’s positions that falsifiability is “of secondary importance” to
scientific progress, that psychological phenomena are in principle not “fully reproducible[sic]”, or
that one should conduct conceptual replications before ascertaining that there really is something
to replicate (and the concepts are sufficiently clear; see Lurquin and Miyake, 2017). Falsification
is what makes science self-correcting (Popper, 2005; LeBel et al., in press), and replication is
possible if researchers clearly specify which conditions are crucial for their hypothesis to hold.
Heino et al. Complex Phenomena Require Sophisticated Designs
Risky tests, for example via sufficiently methodologically similar
direct replications, are necessary to produce the insight that some
of our ideas may well be wrong; in the absence of such rigorous
replications, psychology turns into astrology. Such replications
are especially important given that modern psychology has seen
numerous highly influential findings not replicate when tested
via high-powered and transparently executed direct replications
(LeBel et al., in press see curated list of unsuccessful replications
at https://osf.io/8srcd/). Iso-Ahola, however, maintains that
“phenomena’s existence should not be defined by any index
of reproducibility of findings.” In our opinion, that is an
unnecessary lowering of scientific standards. Instead, falsification
via replicability tests forces the investigators to consider more
fitting measurement or modeling approaches (person-level time
series designs, e.g., Molenaar and Campbell, 2009; highly-
repeated within-person designs, e.g., Whitsett and Shoda, 2014),
better experimental designs, and more sophisticated paradigms.
Now, we should not pretend falsification is easy, especially
in psychology. It is challenging to confirm that auxiliary
hypotheses—e.g., soundness of measurement and experimental
procedures—are reasonable (Meehl, 1990; LeBel and Peters,
2011; Earp and Trafimow, 2015). This is naturally a challenge
for original studies, too. On the bright side, approaches to
executing direct replications are becoming more sophisticated.
For example, CurateScience.org (LeBel et al., 2017) now
presents “active sample evidence” including positive controls,
manipulation checks, and measurement integrity (e.g., internal
consistency estimates) as a way to help confirm sound auxiliaries
(for an example of a replication reporting a positive control, see
Sanchez et al., 2017). In addition, links to open materials/data are
provided to verify the integrity of replications.
Falsification is also difficult because replications may fail due
to problems with operationalizations of the focal constructs.
Another reason for lack of replicability and generalizability of
psychological phenomena that has been largely overlooked in
the extant literature is their complexity: psychological processes
such as emotions, cognitions, personality characteristics, or
mental disorders are highly multi-causal, with thousands of
determinants that often have very small effects on behavior. It
seems like Iso-Ahola refers to this, when he talks about the
“subtle, elusive” nature of psychological phenomena. But the
study of complex dynamic systems (Bar-Yam, 1997; Vallacher
and Nowak, 2008) has been widely successful in other areas
of research in the last decade (e.g., ecology, biology, and
physics), and offers a way forward for psychology too. Complex
systems can be characterized as webs of interdependent self-
organizing parts whose interactions give rise to emergent
properties (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013). Some variations
of this perspective have already been brought to at least
psychopathology (Fried et al., 2017), personality (Mõttus and
Allerhand, 2017), intelligence (Van Der Maas et al., 2017),
development (Smith and Thelen, 2003), language (Beckner et al.,
2009), and public health (Resnicow and Page, 2008).
The consequence of complexity should not be to abandon
replicability, but to embrace it—via sophisticated theories,
improved study designs and operationalizations, and
modern statistical models that adequately account for the
heterogeneity and complexity of psychological phenomena.
Replicability is the only way to self-correct our understanding
of psychological phenomena in a productive and cumulative
fashion.
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